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DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF ‘CREATIVE INDUSTRIES’ 
 
Susan Galloway and Stewart Dunlop 
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Creative industries’ and ‘cultural industries’ are terms that tend to be used interchangeably 
by UK policymakers.  However their meanings and uses are in fact very different.  In this 
paper we will be exploring the differences between the two and arguing that, despite how 
influential it has become, the creative industries definition adopted by the British 
government is ill conceived in relation to culture. 
 
First, it confuses or conflates culture and creativity, two quite different concepts. This is 
partly because of terminological confusion about the word culture, which we will look at 
later in more detail. Second, we argue that the UK creative industries definition is wedded 
to notions of the knowledge economy, within which culture is valued primarily for its 
economic contribution. The result is a creative industries definition that fails to take account 
of the importance and distinctiveness of culture – in policy terms the creative arts have 
been subsumed within a concept which, as we shall show, has no cultural content at all. 
 
While a lot of the arts world is very pleased to be included in the creative industries, there 
is also uneasiness about where the arts sit within these. This has been presented as the 
arts’ distaste for the world of commerce – in other words a tension between the subsidised 
and the commercial(Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005).  We think this is over-simplistic. The 
economy of the arts is mixed: the publicly funded and commercial have a complex inter-
relationship and UK cultural policymakers have engaged with this reality for years.  It is a 
naïve idea that this is something the creative industries agenda has thrust upon them. 
 
In our view the uneasiness is more because of the perception that the rationale for publicly 
funding culture, and more narrowly, the arts, is being undermined. We will present this 
argument and look at some of the implications for cultural policy of the creative industries 
concept. First, we will look at what the different notions cultural industries and creative 
industries represent in policy terms. We will then turn to the differences between the two 
definitions, in particular comparing the complexity of Throsby’s definition of the cultural 
industries, with the official UK definition of the creative industries (Throsby, 2001) 
  
 
ORIGINS OF THE TWO TERMS 
 
Adorno and Horkheimer originally coined the term cultural industry to make the distinction 
between the traditional artisan based creative arts and industrially produced cultural forms 
(2002).  The arts were specifically not part of the cultural industries.  The term ‘cultural 
industries’ which developed from this – referring to the ‘classic’ cultural industries of film, 
recorded music, broadcasting and publishing – was deployed to incorporate these forms of 
commercial entertainment, mass produced by industrial methods, as an object of 
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government cultural policy.  This was the sense in which the cultural industries became a 
subject of interest to the French government, and to UNESCO in the late 1970s and 1980s 
(Garnham, 1990, Towse, 2000, Flew, 2002). 
 
By adopting the phrase ‘creative industries’ Britain’s New Labour government were doing 
the reverse: in other words bringing the creative arts into an economic policy agenda.  New 
Labour purposefully adopted the term creative industries to replace ‘cultural industries’ 
because it was regarded as a ‘unifying’ and ‘democratising’ notion.  As a rhetorical device, 
it bridges the divide between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture – between the mass market, popular 
cultural products of the cultural industries and the high art of the creative arts, now branded 
‘elitist’.  It also bridges the divide between ‘art’ and ‘industry’ – between the demarcations 
of what is ‘publicly supported’ and what is ‘commercial’.  It thereby provides a holistic 
approach to cultural production in its entirety, overcoming, at least conceptually, the 
traditional division of responsibility for culture within UK government, split between the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the Department responsible for Culture – previously 
Education, then DNH and now the DCMS. 
 
It has been described by Andy Pratt and others as representing the‘re-branding’ of culture 
by the New Labour government (Flew, 2002, Caust, 2003, Pratt, 2004).  The question we 
raise is whether this is simply a change in language, a branding exercise, or whether it 
signals a more significant change in policy approach to culture.  
 
 
DEFINITIONS 
 
The terminological clutter that surrounds the term culture is to some extent responsible, in 
our view, for the failure to adequately consider the differences between cultural and 
creative activities.  In particular, there is an assumption that there is nothing distinctive 
about creativity in the cultural sphere.   Most definitions of the cultural industries are based 
around a combination of five main criteria – creativity, intellectual property, symbolic 
meaning, use value, and methods of production 
 
Creativity  
 
Cultural and creative industries are often described as those that are based upon individual 
creativity, and creativity is the key ingredient in official UK documents (see below). 
However, this would seem, almost tautologically, to define the ‘creative industries’, since 
any activity that involves creativity would necessarily be ‘creative’ (Pratt, 2005:33). Defining 
‘creative industries’ against such a measure is, if nothing else, far too wide to be useful for 
any purpose. Any innovation – including scientific and technical innovations – of any sort in 
any industry is creative, and, in such terms, any industry is, therefore, potentially a ‘creative 
industry’. Conflating cultural creativity with all other forms of creativity fails to take adequate 
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account of important differences between cultural and creative industries, a point we 
address below. 
 
Intellectual Property 
 
Intellectual property allows people to own the products of their creativity and therefore to 
exercise both economic and moral rights over these products. Towse comments that in the 
UK, copyright is now viewed as the ‘organising principle’ for the creative industries and is 
the basis for defining the cultural industries (2003: 170).  
 
However, it is equally clear that defining creative industries by their ability to generate 
intellectual property runs up against the same problem as defining them by using ‘general’ 
creativity – many types of creative activity, including science, engineering, and academia, 
generate intellectual property. We also believe that defining the cultural sector by its ability 
to generate intellectual property is again too wide-ranging, since it again fails to identify 
adequately the distinctive aspects of the cultural sector.  
 
We should recognise that advocates of the ‘knowledge economy’ model, such as Howkins 
(2002) do argue that the term ‘creative industry’ should apply to any industry where ‘brain 
power is preponderant and where the outcome is intellectual property’ (Howkins, 2002: 2). 
They argue, on this basis, that the boundaries of official DCMS definitions (the UK 
government Department for Culture, Media and Sport, DCMS) should be extended to 
include both business and scientific creativity.  
This ‘everything is creative’ argument also underlies the UK government’s approach to 
creative industries, which it defines as 
 
those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which 
have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of 
intellectual property”1 
 
There is a sharp conflict between this view, which sees cultural production as just one type 
of creativity, and the alternative view that culture and cultural products are something 
distinctive.. For adherents of the latter view, however, definitions based on concepts of 
creativity and/or intellectual property alone do not adequately explain what is ‘cultural’ 
about the ‘cultural’ or ‘creative’ industries.  These writers place value on a third concept, 
‘symbolic meaning’.  
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Symbolic ‘goods’ or ‘symbolic meaning’ 
 
The ‘everything is creative’ approach is opposed by writers who place value on the concept 
of ‘symbolic meaning’. For these commentators, the generation, or communication, of 
symbolic meaning is the defining concept of culture and the economic value of goods is 
derived from, or reflects, their cultural value. In his 2001 study, Economics and Culture, 
Throsby examined the etymology of the term ‘culture’. Drawing on the work of Raymond 
Williams (1976, 1981), he showed that, while it was originally defined in terms of cultivating 
the soil, the meaning of culture was later refined to encompass individual intellectual and 
artistic cultivation: it is for this reason that we continue to refer to a person who is 
conversant in the arts as ‘cultivated’ (2001: 3).  In its original sense, therefore, culture was 
used to describe activities that contributed to the intellectual and artistic development of 
individuals.  
 
However, during the nineteenth century the use of the term ‘culture’ was expanded, and it 
began to be applied in a wider sense, to describe the set of beliefs held in common by 
different societies. In the context of nineteenth-century nation building in particular, the 
term began to refer particularly to the development of individual nations. It thus evolved 
from describing the intellectual development of the individual, and began to be applied to 
describing features such as the belief system, customs, expressions, and so on, of a 
people or society. Subsequent development of this latter usage simply extends this 
definition further, and it has come to be used at a more micro level to describe a set of 
attitudes, expressions and customs common to or shared by groups within societies. For 
example, we now commonly talk about a ‘drug culture’, ‘youth culture’, and, at the very 
micro level, even of companies having a ‘corporate culture’.   
 
However, it is also clear that, whatever group of people within society is under discussion, 
producing culture is essentially about generating and communicating some type of 
meaning. Thus O’Connor defines the cultural industries as ‘those activities which deal 
primarily in symbolic goods – goods whose primary economic value is derived from their 
cultural value’ (1999: 5). This definition, then, includes what O’Connor calls the ‘classical’ 
cultural industries – broadcast media, film, publishing, recorded music, design, 
architecture, new media – and the ‘traditional arts’ – visual art, crafts, theatre, music 
theatre, concerts and performance, literature, museums and galleries – all those activities 
which have been eligible for public funding as ‘art’’ (O’Connor, 1999: 5). 
 
Use value 
 
Others, including Bilton and Leary (2004) and Martin (2004), while agreeing on the 
importance of symbolic meaning, differ from O’Connor by considering a fourth concept, that 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
1 Creative Industries Mapping Document prepared for the DCMS Creative Industries Task Force, October 1998.  
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of ‘use value’ to be the defining characteristic. Symbolic goods and services have as ‘first 
use’ the communication of ideas, rather than a functional value. So while activities which 
produce books, films, plays, music are part of the cultural industries, those such as fashion 
design, advertising and architecture, where there is symbolic content, but where 
functionality comes first, are not considered to be part of the cultural industries.  
 
Throsby (2001) presents a definition that combines all three concepts looked at so far, and 
also incorporates the issue of ‘use value’, allowing consideration of both the economic and 
cultural sides of the cultural industries.  He argues that:  
 
1. the activities of the cultural industries involve some form of creativity in their 
production; 
2. the cultural industries are concerned with the generation and communication of 
symbolic meaning; and, 
3. their output embodies, at least potentially, some form of intellectual property.  
 
Taking the first two conditions together would seem to define the cultural industries. The 
first condition means that the activity involves some type of creativity, while the second 
limits this to symbolic meaning, importantly excluding the generation of scientific or 
functional knowledge.  In Throsby’s view all three conditions are necessary to decide 
whether an industry is part of the cultural industries, and while they provide a clear set of 
criteria for doing so, in practise there are considerable difficulties involved in deciding 
whether, and to what extent, individual activities are ‘cultural industries’. 
 
Throsby extends his analysis to define a three-fold classification of cultural industries. At 
the centre of this industry model lie creative arts such as music, dance, theatre, literature, 
visual arts, crafts, plus newer forms such as video art and multimedia. He argues that the 
principal purpose of these industries is to generate and/or communicate meaning about the 
intellectual, moral and/or spiritual behaviour of the individual and/or the beliefs, values, 
norms, and other expressions of groups in society. We may disagree about the extent to 
which individual productions achieve this end, but these industries should properly be 
defined within the cultural sector because generating and communicating meaning is the 
main output of each.  
 
Throsby next extends his approach to include a wider set of activities centred on the 
creative arts, and it is at this point that difficulties begin to appear with regard to the proper 
definition of culture. He broadens his definition in two ways. The first involves extending the 
boundaries of the cultural industries to include industries that operate essentially outside 
the cultural sphere, but where some cultural input into final production may be required. 
Advertising, design and architecture, for example, in addition to producing culture as 
discussed above, may also in some instances use material drawn from the creative arts as 
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inputs into final products. In doing so, it could thus be argued that they generate and 
communicate symbolic meaning. 
 
This, however, suggests that culture is used as an input into the production process of 
other industries. If, for example, an advertising campaign uses a reference taken from a 
painting, then it uses the output of a cultural industry to produce its own output. Industries 
that use cultural output may thus help to propagate culture, but since they do not 
themselves produce culture, they are not a part of the cultural industries. 
 
Throsby’s second extension is to include industries that produce goods which involve some 
degree of cultural output, but where it is difficult to ascertain the proportion of cultural and 
non-cultural output – in economic terminology, these activities produce ‘joint goods’, and it 
is at this point that more substantial difficulties begin to appear with regard to the proper 
definition of culture. 
 
Joint goods  
 
This includes industries that may produce some cultural goods in the sense used above, 
but where industry output also involves the production of non-cultural goods – that is, the 
proportion of ‘core’ cultural goods is lower than in the creative arts. Throsby here is 
addressing essentially the same point identified by both Bilton and Leary (2004) and Martin 
(2004). However, while they argue that it is possible to define precisely whether a good is 
cultural or functional, Throsby’s argument recognises that for many goods it may be difficult 
to ascertain the proportions of cultural and functional value. 
 
One example of this would be architecture, where the design of buildings may make 
cultural statements that extend beyond purely functional aspects. We would then have to 
decide what proportion of this output is ‘cultural’ as opposed to ‘functional’. Similarly, 
advertising and design may produce genuinely cultural statements, and the value created 
is both cultural and non-cultural. Clearly the balance is extremely difficult to identify.  
 
Terminological clutter  
 
However, difficulty in identifying the balance between the cultural and functional output of 
any commodity is not the only problem here – a second arises from terminological clutter. 
We discussed earlier how the use of the term culture has broadened over time. This has 
now created the problem that it has become increasingly difficult to agree on where to draw 
the line. 
 
For example, Flew (2002: 13) discusses the way in which the use of the term has been 
extended over time, and points to the definitional problems that this creates. If we define 
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cultural industries as those involved in the production of symbolic goods and services, he 
asks whether it is now ‘possible to exclude any activity of industrial production that has a 
symbolic content? Is the design and production of a Coca-Cola can a part of the cultural 
industry’ (Flew (2002: 13).  
 
The problem arises from the way in which the term itself is now increasingly used in an 
anthropological sense to describe aspects of everyday life. Flew argues that this 
development has its roots in the notion that culture (in this sense) is becoming an 
increasingly important part of everyday life, particularly with regard to consumption of 
goods and services – consumers are argued to use increasingly commodities to construct 
a personal identity, a process which Lash and Urry (1994: 61) call ‘the semiotisation of 
everyday life’. So,  
 
Culture is thus recast from a distinct sphere of social life to something that 
permeates everything, from the design of urban spaces, offices, means of 
transport and communication…. to the promotional strategies of corporations and 
increasingly governments (Flew, 2002: 2). 
 
Used in this sense, we might equally conclude that ‘everything is cultural’ and that the term 
is used in such a wide sense that it is impossible to assign it any actual meaning. 
 
 
 
Production methods 
 
 
The importance of production methods to an understanding of the cultural industries was 
first identified by Adorno, who distinguished between those cultural industries that employ 
industrial technology and modes of organisation to produce and distribute cultural goods 
and services, which are themselves produced by largely traditional or pre-industrial means 
(such as books and records), and those where the cultural form is industrial (such as 
newspapers, films and television programmes) (see Garnham, 1990). 
 
It is often a combination of symbolic meaning and industrial-scale production methods that 
is understood to characterise the cultural industries (Garnham, 1990; Hesmondhalgh, 
2002). This definition produces a list of what are often regarded as the ‘classic’ cultural 
industries, namely film, broadcasting, publishing and recorded music. Towse (2003: 170) 
describes the cultural industries as those which ‘mass-produce goods and services with 
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sufficient artistic content to be considered creatively and culturally significant. The essential 
features are industrial-scale production combined with cultural content’. Reviewing the 
cultural economics literature of the 1990s, Towse notes that as the ‘creative arts’ do not 
employ industrial-scale production methods, they are typically excluded from definitions of 
the cultural industries deployed by cultural economists.  
 
For Hesmondhalgh (2002: 12) ‘the core cultural industries deal with the industrial 
production and circulation of texts (the production of social meaning) and are centrally 
reliant on the work of symbol creators’ (his term for artists)Hesmondhalgh’s list of core 
cultural industries therefore excludes the creative arts, but includes: advertising and 
marketing, broadcasting, film industries, internet industry, music industries: recording, 
publishing and live performance, print and publishing including books, video and computer 
games. For Hesmondhalgh the creative arts – including drama and visual arts – are 
‘peripheral’ cultural industries’; while they are centrally concerned with the production of 
texts (symbolic meaning), they use semi-industrial or non-industrial methods of production. 
 
This understanding, based on industrial production methods, was the one on which 
UNESCO based its enquiry into the cultural industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Significantly, UNESCO placed the issue of political and economic control of the 
technological and industrial production of culture central to the question of cultural 
development, particularly in developing countries. There is therefore a direct line between 
UNESCO’s early analysis of cultural industries and current debates around the notion of 
‘cultural rights’ and the protection of cultural diversity (UNESCO, 1982 and 2005). This is 
based on an understanding of the distinctiveness of cultural goods and markets and the 
consequences of market failure. 
 
In light of the above discussion it should be clear that we doubt whether the production 
method is itself a sufficient basis on which to define those activities that produce culture. It 
is evident that either industrial or artisan methods can produce culture.  For example, a 
stage production of Don Giovanni and Losey’s film of Don Giovanni are simply different 
ways of presenting the same Mozart opera – defining cultural industries by production 
method simply loses sight of what is being produced. However it is the mass character of 
production that allows cultural industries to dominate consumption, and the structure and 
organisation of these industries that raises issues of ‘gatekeeping’ and control (Grant and 
Wood, 2004; Caves, 2000). Production methods don’t define what culture is, but are crucial 
for explaining why these industries must be considered part of cultural and not just 
economic policy.  
 
CULTURE AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
The increased use of the term culture in the anthropologic sense discussed above, and the 
absorption of the cultural industries within the wider creative industries agenda, are both 
related to increased interest in the so-called ‘knowledge economy’. Analysis of the 
knowledge economy suggests that competitive advantage is increasingly derived from 
investment in intangibles, particularly information. Such information may be functional or 
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scientific, but certain of the trends discussed above (e.g. a more sophisticated consumer 
demand) have led to suggestions that knowledge-intensity is an increasingly important 
competitive device in a wide range of consumer markets. One information set that, it is 
argued, increasingly underlies competitive advantage in such markets is the anthropologic 
type of cultural information discussed earlier. 
 
Much has been written on how the knowledge economy affects the cultural and creative 
sectors (Flew, 2002; Cunningham, 2001). But what is most relevant for present purposes is 
that increased interest in leveraging the economic potential of knowledge is clearly a 
further reason why the distinctive aspects of the cultural sector have been subsumed within 
the wider creative industries agenda – culture is now viewed as just one more ‘knowledge 
economy asset’.  
 
The key problem, once again, is that discussed earlier – the failure to distinguish between 
cultural and other creative activities.  This failure causes, in a policy sense, two problems. 
Firstly, it means that we lose the ability to measure the actual contribution that cultural (i.e. 
symbolic) goods make within the knowledge economy context. For example, we do not 
know whether advertising or opera, both designated as ‘creative’ industries, has the more 
significant economic effect. More significantly, conflating culture with other creative 
activities again fails to recognise the distinctive aspect of symbolic culture. We now turn to 
address this issue. 
 
CULTURAL DISTINCTIVENESS 
 
Two factors define the distinctiveness of cultural products, one political/ideological, the 
other economic. These factors differentiate cultural goods from the wider set of creative 
industries and have important consequences for public policy towards the cultural 
industries. 
 
Symbolic ideas and freedom of expression 
 
We have argued above that cultural products are distinctive from other creative activities 
because they are about the production and circulation of symbolic ideas. Cultural activities 
thus play a central role in the freedom of human expression, and this provides a direct link 
to questions of democracy.  Enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is the 
principle that every citizen should have the ability, through cultural participation, to freely 
develop their personality, and take part in the exchange of ideas (UNESCO,1970: 9).  For 
this reason, we find ourselves agreeing with Dworkin’s proposition that the state, through 
cultural policy, has a role in ensuring that the “complexity and depth of forms of life” are 
open to the population now and for the future (Dworkin, 1985: 232). This notion of cultural 
expression as a fundamental aspect of human freedom also underpins the UN Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005). 
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Market failure in the market for culture 
 
The distinctiveness of cultural goods also has an important economic dimension, central to 
which are arguments that cultural markets suffer from various types of “market failure”.  
From the argument that arts and culture create both private and non-private values  comes 
the notion that art and culture create benefits both for those who consume them directly (by 
attending a cultural event) and for those who do not attend.  The notion that market failure 
affects cultural markets has a long lineage in the cultural economics literature (Throsby and 
Withers, 1983). The argument is essentially that, because of the existence of non-private 
benefits, the market mechanism working alone will fail to provide the amount of culture that 
society actually wishes to consume, and, importantly, is willing to pay for. This is the force 
of the recent statement by Baumol and Peacock, when they argue that “the arts confer 
benefits that people will experience whether they pay or not.” (2005:2). O’Hagan (1998) 
expresses the same point as follows: 
 
“While the arts do provide a service that can be bought and sold in the market place… they 
also provide another benefit, a non-private benefit that cannot be sold in the market place” 
(O’Hagan, 1998: 22) 
 
 
Viewed from this perspective, market failure is a key justification for post-war state support 
for the arts – indeed, the establishment of Arts Council of Great Britain, can be considered 
as  a form of ‘nationalisation’ of the cultural economy. While currently unfashionable in this 
post-socialist free market era, market failure arguments are none the less robust; at least 
robust enough for the UK government to support the UN Convention on Cultural Diversity 
in October 2005.  It appears that a gritty acknowledgement of its shortcomings runs 
alongside an official acceptance of the free market principle. 
 
 
These two aspects of cultural distinctiveness are crucially interlinked. Both the production 
and consumption of culture are severely restricted if left entirely to the market, and the 
ensuing limitation of the field of cultural participation and expression represents a 
significant democratic deficit both for individuals and society as a whole.  
 
Recognising these distinctive characteristics of culture provides us with clear grounds on 
which to distinguish cultural industries from the wider notion of creative industries. Cultural 
activities, whose primary purpose is to communicate symbolic ideas and meanings, play a 
central role in our ability to communicate and thus in the freedom of human expression.  
The same cannot be said of industries such as fashion design, whose prime purpose is to 
persuade people to buy certain types of clothing, or advertising, whose prime purpose is to 
simply persuade people to buy more.  The key outputs of the cultural industry are not found 
in other parts of the creative industries, however defined, and it is this distinctive 
contribution that is lost by policy stances which subsume cultural creation within the wider 
creative agenda. 
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DEFINITIONS IN UK POLICY 
 
Government interest in the ‘creative industries’ appears to stem from a belief that the UK 
has a strong track record in areas where individual creativity is important (in industries such 
as film and music), that the ‘creative industries’ have enjoyed high economic growth rates, 
and that this ‘creativity’ can be applied to the rest of the economy. 
 
As we have seen, the highly influential DCMS definition of creative industries is based on 
two of the concepts discussed above: creativity and intellectual property. Scottish 
Enterprise (SE) in its ‘Creative Industries Cluster Strategy’ also uses the DCMS definition. 
When defining ‘creative industries’, SE (1999: 4) advances the notion that ‘creative 
industries are those in which creativity fundamentally is the enterprise.’  This could include 
any industry, however, and the meaning of the ‘creative industries’ is, to say the least, 
difficult to pin down. It is clearly extremely difficult, on the basis of the definition supplied by 
SE, to know the extent to which these industries are ‘creative industries’ and thus to 
develop an appropriate set of policy responses. It may include those specified by SE but, if 
the criterion for entry is that ‘creativity fundamentally is the enterprise’, then, as discussed 
above, we could equally well include a range of other industries (see also Bilton and Leary, 
2004:  50).  
 
The problem is that, while the cultural industries can be defined as those that generate 
symbolic meaning (as we have seen above), official definitions of the ‘creative industries’ 
make no reference to symbolic meaning and could involve any type of creative activity. 
Individual creativity could equally well include developing scientific innovations, yet 
industries that develop these are not typically included in definitions of the creative sector. 
The difficulty in identifying specific types of ‘individual creativity’ makes it very difficult to 
decide which industries are ‘creative’. Most importantly, in defining creative industries on 
the basis of creativity and intellectual property, the UK approach also fails to consider the 
nature of cultural creativity and so, as argued above, also loses sight of the distinctive 
public good contribution of culture. 
 
Significantly, the UK’s ‘knowledge economy’ approach contrasts strongly with the 
definitions of cultural goods and services and of cultural industries proposed by UNESCO 
(2005). These combine the concepts of creativity and intellectual property with a strong 
emphasis on the importance of symbolic meaning, which means that they (cultural goods) 
‘embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of the commercial value they may 
have.’ (UNESCO 2005: 5) 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In short, why does this matter? Well definitions matter because they have implications for 
theory, policy and its practical application. These issues raise questions for cultural policy 
in the UK and elsewhere.  Critical examination of the  British government definition of 
creative industries reveals a lack of theoretical clarity.  If the creative industries, by 
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definition, have no cultural content, then we have to ask, is this an error, or have the 
distinctive attributes of culture been purposely overlooked by the UK government in favour 
of a knowledge economy approach?  
 
It is hard to tell. But it was interesting to see the UK government supporting the UN 
Convention Protecting Cultural Diversity in October 2005.  The Convention is founded on a 
definition of cultural goods and services developed with the advice of David Throsby, that 
has symbolic meaning at its heart.  It is therefore in direct contradiction to the official UK 
creative industries definition.  Was that a change of heart, or just a pragmatic vote for 
Britain’s economic interests? 
 
If the UK government does not recognise the distinctiveness of culture and cultural 
creativity, as the creative industries definition suggests, then does this also apply to 
government cultural policy? The creative industries agenda is one to which the UK Arts 
Councils and other cultural agencies are required to contribute. These agencies have 
intervened in the cultural economy for many years, but with cultural objectives. At a 
practical level, if not at a policy or rhetorical level, can these motivations be maintained or 
will they necessarily be over-ridden by economic concerns?  
 
On the one hand government interest in the creative industries has clearly benefitted some 
aspects of the arts through the prioritisation of support for artistic production. But alongside 
an acknowledgement of these gains, is the view that in the longer run culture may be being 
repositioned and with it the established arguments for cultural funding. 
 
If the essence of culture is the production and circulation of symbolic meaning or ideas – 
then there is a clear link to questions of democracy.  The right to develop ourselves 
through cultural expression and participation are recognised as fundamental human rights.  
From this recognition flows a clear role for government cultural policy. But this is not 
acknowledged or addressed by the creative industries paradigm. 
 
Similarly the generation and communication of ideas within society is arguably restricted if 
left entirely to the market. Market failure has been an important justification of government 
support for the arts in post war Britain. The cultural industries concept took this on, arguing 
for a cultural policy for industry or, alternatively, an industrial policy informed by cultural 
objectives. However the creative industries agenda ignores this. In our view, without an 
acceptance of cultural distinctiveness the whole context in which government support is 
debated and assessed is altered and an understanding of the public benefits of culture, 
those that cannot be captured by markets, may be diminished. 
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